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Abstract	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstudy,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexplore	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠin	 ﾠChina	 ﾠvaries	 ﾠ
depending	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠof	 ﾠentry	 ﾠon	 ﾠexport	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠproxies	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
define	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“difficult”	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠis	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
exporting	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ helps	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ ones	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ start	 ﾠ exporting,	 ﾠ especially	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ destination	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠare	 ﾠdifficult.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠon	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠexposure	 ﾠto	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexporters	 ﾠis	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠ10%	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠstart	 ﾠ
exporting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyear	 ﾠafter,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠis	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ50%	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtargeted	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠis	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠas	 ﾠdifficult.	 ﾠOur	 ﾠresults	 ﾠare	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexposure	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠexporters	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠnew	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠlinkages.	 ﾠOur	 ﾠ
finding	 ﾠhence	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠChina	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiversification	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠexports	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠand	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠinaccessible	 ﾠdestinations.	 ﾠ	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1-ﾭ  Introduction	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Recent	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurge	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠexports	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ20	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠpure	 ﾠquantitative	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠview,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠ
statistical	 ﾠyearbooks	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠexports	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
grown	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ26%	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1992	 ﾠto	 ﾠ57%	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2007.	 ﾠFrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠqualitative	 ﾠperspective,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
clear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠexports	 ﾠhave	 ﾠupgraded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠfew	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠRodrik	 ﾠ(2006)	 ﾠfinds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ sophistication	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Chinese	 ﾠ exports	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ disproportionately	 ﾠ high,	 ﾠ three	 ﾠ times	 ﾠ higher	 ﾠ
actually	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠby	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠincome	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita.	 ﾠSchott	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠ
shows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverlap	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠexports	 ﾠand	 ﾠexports	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
high	 ﾠand	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠA	 ﾠconsensus	 ﾠhas	 ﾠemerged	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ
played	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠpart	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠevolution.	 ﾠAmiti	 ﾠand	 ﾠFreund	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠshow	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ once	 ﾠ processing	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ excluded,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ skill	 ﾠ content	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Chinese	 ﾠ exports	 ﾠ remains	 ﾠ
unchanged.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠprocessing	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠare	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠby	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
suggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠno	 ﾠupgrading	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠexports.	 ﾠXu	 ﾠand	 ﾠLu	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠexport	 ﾠupgrading	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠemanates	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfully	 ﾠforeign-ﾭ‐
owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠOECD.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfind	 ﾠexport	 ﾠsophistication	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠan	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
positively	 ﾠ related	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ share	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ processing	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ realized	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ firms,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
negatively	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠprocessing	 ﾠexports	 ﾠrealized	 ﾠby	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠ results	 ﾠ suggest	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ account	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ quantitative	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
qualitative	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠexports.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠalso	 ﾠexert	 ﾠan	 ﾠindirect	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠones	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers.	 ﾠVery	 ﾠfew	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠexist	 ﾠon	 ﾠexport	 ﾠ
spillovers.	 ﾠKrautheim	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠbuilds	 ﾠa	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠexport	 ﾠcost	 ﾠdecreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ already	 ﾠ exporting	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ destination.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ rationale	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
assumption	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ information	 ﾠ spillovers	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ mutualization.	 ﾠ Exporting	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ
diffuse	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠon	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠconsumers’	 ﾠtastes	 ﾠor	 ﾠon	 ﾠexport	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠ
procedures	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠneighborhood	 ﾠto	 ﾠenter	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ markets.	 ﾠ Exporting	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ mutualize	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ costs	 ﾠ linked	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
participation	 ﾠto	 ﾠinternational	 ﾠfares	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransport	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcommodities,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
reduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠcost	 ﾠto	 ﾠconquer	 ﾠnew	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠmight	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
firms,	 ﾠby	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexport,	 ﾠshow	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
latter	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠexist	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠ
conflicting	 ﾠresults	 ﾠexist	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtopic:	 ﾠAitken	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(1997)	 ﾠfind	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
positive	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠexport	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠconducted	 ﾠby	 ﾠmultinationals	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexport	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Mexican	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ firms.	 ﾠ Kneller	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Pisu	 ﾠ (2007)	 ﾠ confirm	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ UK	 ﾠ data.	 ﾠ
Evidence	 ﾠis	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠless	 ﾠclear	 ﾠfor	 ﾠBarrios	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2003)	 ﾠon	 ﾠSpanish	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠRuane	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Sutherland	 ﾠ(2005)	 ﾠfind	 ﾠa	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexports	 ﾠon	 ﾠentry	 ﾠof	 ﾠIrish	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠ
firms	 ﾠon	 ﾠexport	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Recent	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠencouraging	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠChina.	 ﾠSwenson	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠ
finds	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ positive	 ﾠ impact	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ exports	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ creation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ linkages	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
Chinese	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ firms,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Chen	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Swenson	 ﾠ (2010)	 ﾠ show	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ exports	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunit	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdurability	 ﾠof	 ﾠnew	 ﾠtransactions	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠby	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ
Mayneris	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Poncet	 ﾠ (2011)	 ﾠ investigate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ nature	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ specificity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
spillovers.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠare	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠspecific:	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠstart	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠ responds	 ﾠ positively	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ province	 ﾠ
exporting,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ year	 ﾠ before,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ country.	 ﾠ Foreign	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ
activities	 ﾠ considered	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ (same	 ﾠ product/other	 ﾠ countries,	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ
countries/same	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ products/other	 ﾠ countries)	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ much	 ﾠ weaker	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ
insignificant.1	 ﾠ They	 ﾠ moreover	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ spillovers	 ﾠ derive	 ﾠ mainly	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ
ordinary	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠactivities.	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠare	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
sophisticated	 ﾠproducts,	 ﾠsuggesting	 ﾠan	 ﾠindirect	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠon	 ﾠsophistication	 ﾠ
upgrading	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠexports.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ paper,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ strongly	 ﾠ build	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ Mayneris	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Poncet	 ﾠ (2011)	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ explore	 ﾠ another	 ﾠ
dimension	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ spillovers	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ China.	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ investigate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ possible	 ﾠ
heterogeneity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ spillovers	 ﾠ depending	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ difficulty	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ entry	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ
markets.	 ﾠ All	 ﾠ destination	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ equally	 ﾠ easy	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ enter	 ﾠ on.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ particular,	 ﾠ
administrative	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠto	 ﾠfill	 ﾠin,	 ﾠcorruption,	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠor	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠuncertainty,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
necessitate	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ knowledge	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ potential	 ﾠ exporters;	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
fixed	 ﾠexport	 ﾠcost,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠshown	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠfirm-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠenter	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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1	 ﾠKoenig	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2010a)	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠresult	 ﾠon	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠin	 ﾠFrance,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠand	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
export	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠ(Melitz,	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠCrozet	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample	 ﾠa	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠ
model	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠinsecurity	 ﾠon	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠacts	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠrandom	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠsunk	 ﾠcost,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠdisrupts	 ﾠthe	 ﾠusual	 ﾠselection	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠon	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠproductivity.	 ﾠ
Araujo	 ﾠ et	 ﾠ al.	 ﾠ (2011)	 ﾠ investigate	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ role	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ quality	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ destination	 ﾠ
markets	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ firm-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ dynamics.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ model,	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ learn	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ own	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠon	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠmore	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsequence,	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠstart	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠquantities	 ﾠon	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠ
markets,	 ﾠand	 ﾠconditioning	 ﾠon	 ﾠsurvival,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirm-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠexports	 ﾠdecreases	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠquality	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwork,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠ
market:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠquality	 ﾠor	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠmeasured	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠICRG	 ﾠ
index	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcombines	 ﾠpolitical,	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠ(defined	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠ
below),	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomplexity	 ﾠof	 ﾠimport	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠmeasured	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ days	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ documents	 ﾠn e e d e d 	 ﾠt o 	 ﾠd e l i v e r 	 ﾠp r o d u c t s 	 ﾠi n 	 ﾠt h i s 	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠ (measured	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Doing	 ﾠ Business	 ﾠ databases	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ World	 ﾠ Bank,	 ﾠ see	 ﾠ below).	 ﾠ
Thanks	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmeasures,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠelements	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠlinked	 ﾠboth	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ
climate	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ business	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ procedures	 ﾠ required	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
imports.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Preliminary	 ﾠstatistics	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeographic	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠstress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
improvement	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠreach	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠdestinations.	 ﾠBetween	 ﾠ1998	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2007,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠexport	 ﾠflows	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtop	 ﾠdecile	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
required	 ﾠto	 ﾠimport	 ﾠas	 ﾠmeasured	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠBank	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠdatabase2	 ﾠrose	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
8.5	 ﾠto	 ﾠ12.3%.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠon	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠexport	 ﾠstarts,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠ increasing	 ﾠ faster	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ jumped	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ 11.3	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ 17.9%,	 ﾠ attesting	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ enhanced	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠto	 ﾠpenetrate	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ wonder	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ increasing	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ multinational	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ appears	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ evolution	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ orientation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ China’s	 ﾠ integration	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ world	 ﾠ
economy.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠworld	 ﾠduration	 ﾠis	 ﾠ27	 ﾠdays,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ44	 ﾠdays	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠto	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcustoms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtop	 ﾠ
decile	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠSee	 ﾠsection	 ﾠ2.1	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠindicator.	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠwe	 ﾠthink	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠquality	 ﾠor	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠduties	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠexport	 ﾠcost,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
marginal	 ﾠ impact	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ spillovers	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ difficult	 ﾠ
countries.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdiffusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠvaluable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠKoenig	 ﾠ
et	 ﾠ al.	 ﾠ (2010b)	 ﾠ investigate	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ French	 ﾠ firm-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠ data.	 ﾠ They	 ﾠ show	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
probability	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ entry	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ positively	 ﾠ impacted	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
surrounding	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠdestinations.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠdata	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Chinese	 ﾠexports	 ﾠby	 ﾠprovince,	 ﾠproduct,	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠand	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ(foreign	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠ firms).	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ merge	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ data	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ indicators	 ﾠ taken	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ International	 ﾠ
Country	 ﾠRisk	 ﾠGuide	 ﾠand	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDoing	 ﾠBusiness	 ﾠdatabase	 ﾠedited	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠBank.	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠ indicators	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ informative	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ quality	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ toughness	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
administrative	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠlinked	 ﾠto	 ﾠimports	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠare	 ﾠthen	 ﾠ
able	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvestigate	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠheterogeneity	 ﾠof	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Chinese	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠstart	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠdepending	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠof	 ﾠentry	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠexport	 ﾠmarket.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠactually	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
export	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠpointing	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠ
role	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ geographic	 ﾠ diversification	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Chinese	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ exports	 ﾠ
toward	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠ present	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ data	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ empirical	 ﾠ methodology	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ section	 ﾠ 2.	 ﾠ Section	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
discusses	 ﾠour	 ﾠresults	 ﾠand	 ﾠsection	 ﾠ4	 ﾠconcludes.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2-ﾭ  Data	 ﾠand	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠour	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠexposure	 ﾠto	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexporters	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextensive	 ﾠ
margin	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠKoenig	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2010a	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2010b)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Mayneris	 ﾠand	 ﾠPoncet	 ﾠ(2011),	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠi	 ﾠexport	 ﾠ
product	 ﾠk	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠj	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠt+1,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠt.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠa	 ﾠgravity	 ﾠ
framework	 ﾠ applied	 ﾠt o 	 ﾠt h e 	 ﾠd e c i s i o n 	 ﾠt o 	 ﾠs t a r t 	 ﾠe x p o r t i n g . 	 ﾠW e 	 ﾠr e s t r i c t 	 ﾠo u r 	 ﾠa n a l y s i s 	 ﾠt o 	 ﾠ
ordinary	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ activities,	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ dependent	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ spillover	 ﾠ variables,	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ
Mayneris	 ﾠand	 ﾠPoncet	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠhave	 ﾠshown	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠin	 ﾠChina	 ﾠare	 ﾠ





We	 ﾠuse	 ﾠcustoms	 ﾠdata	 ﾠon	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠexports	 ﾠby	 ﾠprovince,	 ﾠHS6	 ﾠproduct,	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ(domestic	 ﾠand	 ﾠforeign3)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ1997-ﾭ‐2007.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐
aggregate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHS4	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfairly	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠ
level.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHS2	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠcategory	 ﾠ“clocks	 ﾠand	 ﾠwatches	 ﾠand	 ﾠparts	 ﾠthereof”	 ﾠ
comprises	 ﾠ14	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ4-ﾭ‐digit	 ﾠproducts,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwrist-ﾭ‐watches	 ﾠin	 ﾠprecious	 ﾠmetal	 ﾠto	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
registers,	 ﾠpassing	 ﾠby	 ﾠwrist-ﾭ‐watches	 ﾠin	 ﾠbase	 ﾠmetal.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠthus	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠbig	 ﾠproduct-ﾭ‐lines,	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠworking	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠnomenclature	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠimplied	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠcases	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠvarieties	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠproduct.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Thanks	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbuild	 ﾠa	 ﾠdatabase	 ﾠrecording	 ﾠall	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠentries	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ province-ﾭ‐product-ﾭ‐destination	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ level.	 ﾠ Our	 ﾠ
dependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ1	 ﾠif	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠexport	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
given	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠin	 ﾠt+1,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠt.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠprovince,	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠas	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠalternatives	 ﾠall	 ﾠproduct-ﾭ‐country	 ﾠpairs	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
least	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ positive	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ flow	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ period.	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ focus	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ starts	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
consequently	 ﾠeliminate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsample	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
ceasing	 ﾠexport	 ﾠflows.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ10	 ﾠyears	 ﾠof	 ﾠobservations,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠobserve,	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
period,	 ﾠ multiple	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ starts	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ province-ﾭ‐product-ﾭ‐destination	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ
triad.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ following	 ﾠ sequence	 ﾠ 00011001111	 ﾠ becomes	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ sample	 ﾠ
.001..01...,	 ﾠ“.”	 ﾠdenoting	 ﾠmissing	 ﾠvalues.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠtriads	 ﾠwith	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠexport	 ﾠ
start	 ﾠremain	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsample.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠsample	 ﾠcovers	 ﾠ220	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1213	 ﾠHS4	 ﾠ
products.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Regarding	 ﾠ data	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ quality	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ toughness	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ import	 ﾠ procedures	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
destination	 ﾠ countries,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ databases.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ one	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ International	 ﾠ Risk	 ﾠ
Country	 ﾠGuide	 ﾠdataset	 ﾠ(ICRG),	 ﾠedited	 ﾠsince	 ﾠ1980	 ﾠby	 ﾠan	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠAmerican	 ﾠinstitute,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠPRS	 ﾠgroup.	 ﾠA	 ﾠcomposite	 ﾠindex	 ﾠis	 ﾠcomputed,	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthree	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐indices,	 ﾠmeasuring	 ﾠ
respectively	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠ
data	 ﾠ source	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Doing	 ﾠ Business	 ﾠ database	 ﾠ elaborated	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ World	 ﾠ Bank.	 ﾠ Several	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ data	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ separately	 ﾠ reported	 ﾠ by	 ﾠf i r m 	 ﾠt y p e , 	 ﾠi n c l u d i n g 	 ﾠf o r e i g n -ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠ enterprises,	 ﾠ equity	 ﾠ joint	 ﾠ
ventures	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Sino-ﾭ‐foreign	 ﾠ joint	 ﾠ ventures,	 ﾠ collective	 ﾠ enterprises,	 ﾠ private	 ﾠ enterprises	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ state-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠ
enterprises.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠthree	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠas	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠlater	 ﾠas	 ﾠdomestic.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ7	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
variables	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠof	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠare	 ﾠrecorded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
database.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠwork	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ days	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ needed	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ import	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ commodities	 ﾠ
transported	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ standard	 ﾠ cargo.	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ documents	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ calculated	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
signature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelivery	 ﾠof	 ﾠgoods,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠis	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarrival	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcargo	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠharbor.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠappear	 ﾠas	 ﾠgood	 ﾠproxies	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
toughness	 ﾠof	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠan	 ﾠexporter	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠface	 ﾠto	 ﾠsell	 ﾠits	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ given	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
country.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.2	 ﾠEstimated	 ﾠequation	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠa	 ﾠgravity	 ﾠequation	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠstart	 ﾠexporting.	 ﾠMore	 ﾠprecisely,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
assume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠi	 ﾠstart	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠ
k	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠj	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠt+1	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwritten	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Prob(domestic	 ﾠstartikjt+1)	 ﾠ=	 ﾠProb(αforeign	 ﾠspill.ikjt	 ﾠ+	 ﾠβ1Zt	 ﾠ+	 ﾠβ2Zt-ﾭ‐1	 ﾠ+	 ﾠηikj	 ﾠ+µt	 ﾠ+	 ﾠεikjt+1>0)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
where	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠspill.ikjt	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠproxy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠexports	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠj	 ﾠby	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠi	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠt	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠ
below),	 ﾠZ	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠbunch	 ﾠof	 ﾠtime-ﾭ‐varying	 ﾠcontrols	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠto	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠj	 ﾠand/or	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
province	 ﾠi	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexport	 ﾠflow	 ﾠemanates,	 ﾠηikj	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠprovince-ﾭ‐product-ﾭ‐destination	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠand	 ﾠµt	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠyear	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeterminants	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
probability	 ﾠ thanks	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ conditional	 ﾠ logit	 ﾠ estimation.	 ﾠ Given	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ province-ﾭ‐
product-ﾭ‐destination	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ fixed	 ﾠ effects,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ impact	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ explanatory	 ﾠ variables	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
estimated	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ dimension.	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ test	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ heterogeneity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ spillovers	 ﾠ
depending	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ difficulty	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ entry	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ markets	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ splitting	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ sample	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ
groups	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ countries,	 ﾠ using	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ threshold	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ mean	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ country-ﾭ‐specific	 ﾠ
measures	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠquality	 ﾠand	 ﾠtoughness	 ﾠof	 ﾠimport	 ﾠprocedures.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
results	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhold	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠusing	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Several	 ﾠremarks	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠstrategy.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠa	 ﾠlogit	 ﾠ
estimation	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ province-ﾭ‐product-ﾭ‐destination	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ fixed	 ﾠ effects.	 ﾠ From	 ﾠ a	 ﾠt e c h n i c a l 	 ﾠ
point	 ﾠof	 ﾠview,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtriads	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠexport	 ﾠflows,	 ﾠor	 ﾠon	 ﾠ8	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠopposite	 ﾠnull	 ﾠexport	 ﾠflows,	 ﾠall	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestimation.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠwould	 ﾠperfectly	 ﾠpredict	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcome.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠlegitimates	 ﾠex-ﾭpost	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlimitation	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠsample	 ﾠto	 ﾠtriads	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠone	 ﾠexport	 ﾠstart	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
From	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠconceptual	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠview,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
really	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtiming	 ﾠof	 ﾠentry.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠrelate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyear	 ﾠof	 ﾠentry	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠexport	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ year	 ﾠ before.	 ﾠ If	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ apprehended	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
continuous	 ﾠtime	 ﾠduration	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstill	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠusing	 ﾠa	 ﾠdiscrete	 ﾠtime	 ﾠmodel.	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠHess	 ﾠand	 ﾠPersson	 ﾠ(2010,	 ﾠ2011)	 ﾠcontinuous-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠmethods	 ﾠperform	 ﾠpoorly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠ
annual	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠdatasets	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmany	 ﾠshort-ﾭ‐lived	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠours.	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠsample	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠa	 ﾠlot	 ﾠof	 ﾠentries	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
exits	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠon	 ﾠexport	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠDiscrete-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠspecifications	 ﾠwith	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠ
controls	 ﾠare	 ﾠpreferable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠa	 ﾠlogit	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtriadic	 ﾠ
(province-ﾭ‐product-ﾭ‐destination	 ﾠcountry)	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠeffects.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠare	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠ
only.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠshort	 ﾠrun	 ﾠdeterminants	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentry	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠon	 ﾠexport	 ﾠ
markets.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠobserve,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
lot	 ﾠof	 ﾠvariations	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexport	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
existence	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠshort	 ﾠrun	 ﾠdeterminants	 ﾠof	 ﾠentry.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshort	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong	 ﾠrun:	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠmight	 ﾠfacilitate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
entry	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ make,	 ﾠ due	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ competition	 ﾠ effects,	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ
relationships	 ﾠless	 ﾠdurable.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠin	 ﾠChina:	 ﾠMayneris	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠPoncet	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠholds	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠ consider	 ﾠ durable	 ﾠ starts	 ﾠ only4,	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ Chen	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Swenson	 ﾠ (2009)	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
presence	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexports	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdurability	 ﾠof	 ﾠnew	 ﾠexport	 ﾠtransactions	 ﾠcreated	 ﾠ
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4	 ﾠDefined	 ﾠas	 ﾠexports	 ﾠfor	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠconsecutive	 ﾠyears.	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2.3	 ﾠSpillover	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Export	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠhave	 ﾠoften	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠstudied	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠquite	 ﾠaggregated	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠSwenson	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠChen	 ﾠand	 ﾠSwenson	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠexplore	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠHS2	 ﾠ
category.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠthus	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠone	 ﾠhundred	 ﾠsectors	 ﾠof	 ﾠactivities.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠthink	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
worth	 ﾠinvestigating	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠfiner	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠnomenclature.	 ﾠ
Many	 ﾠexport	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠare	 ﾠactually	 ﾠdefined	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠfine	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ likely	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ specific	 ﾠ tastes	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ consumers	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ vary	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ detailed	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
product.	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ vein,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ destination-ﾭ‐country	 ﾠ dimension	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ generally	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ
overlooked,	 ﾠoften	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠmany	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠimpediments	 ﾠor	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
peculiarities	 ﾠin	 ﾠconsumers’	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠare	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Koenig	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠconfirm	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers.	 ﾠ
They	 ﾠshow,	 ﾠon	 ﾠFrench	 ﾠfirm-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠare	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
product	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠspecific.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠstarts	 ﾠis	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠsurrounded	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠMayneris	 ﾠand	 ﾠPoncet	 ﾠ(2011)	 ﾠ
find	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠresult	 ﾠfor	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠin	 ﾠChina:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ start	 ﾠ exporting	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ k	 ﾠt o 	 ﾠc o u n t r y 	 ﾠj	 ﾠi s 	 ﾠp o s i t i v e l y 	 ﾠr e l a ted	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
presence	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠj	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyear	 ﾠbefore.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠthus	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠhere	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠspillover.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Another	 ﾠissue	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠactivities.	 ﾠLess	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ10%	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠstarts	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠsample	 ﾠare	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyear	 ﾠ
before,	 ﾠof	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexports	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠand	 ﾠsame	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠUsing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexports	 ﾠonly	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠproxy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠproblematic	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
interpretation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ results:	 ﾠ Are	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ spillovers	 ﾠ linked	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ intensity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ
exports,	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmere	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexporters	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovince?	 ﾠAs	 ﾠin	 ﾠMayneris	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠPoncet	 ﾠ(2011),	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠissue	 ﾠby	 ﾠintroducing	 ﾠboth	 ﾠa	 ﾠdummy	 ﾠequal	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
case	 ﾠof	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠexports	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexports.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Note	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbesides	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbring	 ﾠto	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠalso	 ﾠgenerate	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠor	 ﾠcongestion	 ﾠ10	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
effects	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠHale	 ﾠand	 ﾠLong	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠshow	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠputs	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠon	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠand	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwages	 ﾠof	 ﾠskilled	 ﾠ
workers.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdetrimental	 ﾠto	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠexport	 ﾠactivities.	 ﾠLu	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠ
find	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnet	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠgenerated	 ﾠby	 ﾠhorizontal	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠon	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ output	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ productivity	 ﾠ depend	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ distance:	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ positive	 ﾠ
impact	 ﾠon	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠones	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠclose	 ﾠenough.	 ﾠConsequently,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoefficient	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠproxies	 ﾠfor	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinterpreted	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnet	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠof	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠand	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠgenerated	 ﾠby	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠexport	 ﾠactivities.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.4	 ﾠTime-ﾭinvariant	 ﾠand	 ﾠtime	 ﾠvarying	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Many	 ﾠother	 ﾠdeterminants	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠwe	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠexports	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠj	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠboth	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠand	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠi.	 ﾠSome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠare	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
invariant	 ﾠand	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠspecific:	 ﾠProvinces	 ﾠwith	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠinfrastructure	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeducated	 ﾠ
workforce	 ﾠmight	 ﾠattract	 ﾠFDI	 ﾠand	 ﾠfacilitate	 ﾠexports,	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnationality	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠ
Some	 ﾠothers	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠtime	 ﾠinvariant	 ﾠbut	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠspecific:	 ﾠSome	 ﾠ
provinces	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠwith	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠdue	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠmigrants’	 ﾠnetworks,	 ﾠgeographic	 ﾠcontiguity	 ﾠor	 ﾠhistory.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠbilateral	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠij	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠwe	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠexports	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠj	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠboth	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠand	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ
located	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ province	 ﾠ i.	 ﾠ Third,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ exist	 ﾠ time-ﾭ‐invariant	 ﾠ province	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠdeterminants	 ﾠof	 ﾠexport	 ﾠperformance:	 ﾠProvince	 ﾠi	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠ
know-ﾭ‐how	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ k,	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ could	 ﾠ explain	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ good	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ performance	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠand	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlocation.	 ﾠAll	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtime	 ﾠinvariant	 ﾠ
determinants	 ﾠare	 ﾠcontrolled	 ﾠfor	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtriadic	 ﾠ(province-ﾭ‐product-ﾭ‐destination	 ﾠcountry)	 ﾠ
fixed	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠikj	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfinally	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠregression.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠestimations	 ﾠalso	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtime-ﾭ‐varying	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠelements	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠ firms’	 ﾠ exports	 ﾠ activities.	 ﾠ For	 ﾠ example,	 ﾠ comparative	 ﾠ advantages	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ provinces	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ changed	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fast	 ﾠ growing	 ﾠ period	 ﾠ 1997-ﾭ‐2007.	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ consequently	 ﾠ
introduce	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠexports	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠby	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠi,	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠexports	 ﾠof	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠi	 ﾠand	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠ
Chinese	 ﾠexports	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠ k	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠt.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtime	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠ
Chinese	 ﾠexports	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcontrolled	 ﾠfor,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠelements	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠBalassa	 ﾠindex	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
“revealed	 ﾠcomparative	 ﾠadvantage”	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovince-ﾭ‐product	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠare	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount.	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We	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbilateral	 ﾠexport	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠj	 ﾠfor	 ﾠChina	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠi	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠbilateral	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperiod.	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠ finally	 ﾠ introduce	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ GDP	 ﾠ per	 ﾠ capita	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ province	 ﾠ i	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ account	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ supply	 ﾠ side	 ﾠ
determinants	 ﾠof	 ﾠexports.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠevolution	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠmust	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠconsequently	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠworld	 ﾠimports	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠj	 ﾠin	 ﾠyear	 ﾠt,	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBACI	 ﾠdatabase5,	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠper	 ﾠ
capita.6	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠin	 ﾠt-ﾭ1	 ﾠof	 ﾠprovincial	 ﾠand	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠexports	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠimports	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠintroduced,	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠfor	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠdynamics	 ﾠin	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠcomparative	 ﾠadvantages	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
demand.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Last,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexports	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠproxy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠon	 ﾠexport	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠflows	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
product	 ﾠk	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠj	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠoften	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠin	 ﾠprovinces	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
export	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠor	 ﾠexport	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠj	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠt.	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠexports	 ﾠwould	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ
partly	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠamong	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠor	 ﾠscope	 ﾠeconomies	 ﾠin	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠexport	 ﾠ
activities.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠthus	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠexports	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠ(to	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠj	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
definition	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ focus	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ starts)	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ exports	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ j	 ﾠ( o f 	 ﾠ
products	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠk)	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠt.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3-ﾭ  Results	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠreplicate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠin	 ﾠChina	 ﾠ
obtained	 ﾠby	 ﾠMayneris	 ﾠand	 ﾠPoncet	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠWe	 ﾠthen	 ﾠinvestigate	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠalong	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ spillovers	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ vary	 ﾠ depending	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ destination	 ﾠ countries.	 ﾠ All	 ﾠ
regressions	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ clustered	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ province	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ (Moulton,	 ﾠ 1990).	 ﾠ To	 ﾠ split	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ whole	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠThis	 ﾠdataset,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠusing	 ﾠCOMTRADE	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠbilateral	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠflows	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
6-ﾭ‐digit	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ (Gaulier	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Zignago,	 ﾠ 2010).	 ﾠ BACI	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ downloadable	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci.htm.	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠreal	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠin	 ﾠPPP	 ﾠare	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠIndicators	 ﾠdatabase	 ﾠ
(World	 ﾠBank).	 ﾠ12	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
sample,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠthreshold	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmean	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠResults	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠhold	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmedian.7	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.1	 ﾠProduct	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠ focus	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ ordinary	 ﾠ trade	 ﾠ (ODT)	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ starts,	 ﾠ Chinese	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ
mainly	 ﾠ adopting	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ channel	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ enter	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ markets.	 ﾠ Moreover,	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ
spillovers	 ﾠare	 ﾠfound	 ﾠto	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠ(Mayneris	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Poncet,	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠResults	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠof	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ1	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
export	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠexist	 ﾠin	 ﾠChina,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠspecific.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
mere	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠin	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠi	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠj,	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠstart	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠj	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyear	 ﾠafter	 ﾠby	 ﾠ10.96%8,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2.40	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠpoint.	 ﾠA	 ﾠ10%	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexports	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠj	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsame	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
0.10%9,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠby	 ﾠ0.02	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠpoint.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
insignificant,	 ﾠor	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠin	 ﾠmagnitude	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexports	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠthan	 ﾠj).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠto	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠones	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠspecific.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠso	 ﾠsurprising	 ﾠsince	 ﾠconsumers’	 ﾠtastes	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠquality	 ﾠnorms	 ﾠand	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠimposed	 ﾠon	 ﾠimports	 ﾠare	 ﾠoften	 ﾠboth	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
destination	 ﾠspecific.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠthen	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠin	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠODT	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexports	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠprocessing	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠ(PCS)	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠexports.	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠODT	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexports	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠj	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠt	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠand	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠstart	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠj	 ﾠin	 ﾠt+1.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠPCS	 ﾠtrade,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠexports	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdummy	 ﾠaccounting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ exporters	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ weakly	 ﾠ significant.	 ﾠ Again,	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ exports	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠThese	 ﾠresults	 ﾠare	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠupon	 ﾠrequest	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthors.	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlogistic	 ﾠfunction,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠgenerated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsole	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ exporting	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ k	 ﾠt o 	 ﾠc o u n t r y 	 ﾠj	 ﾠi s 	 ﾠe q u a l 	 ﾠt o 	 ﾠ[ e 0.104	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐	 ﾠ1 ] % . 	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ expressed	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ
percentage	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠis	 ﾠfound	 ﾠby	 ﾠmultiplying	 ﾠby	 ﾠthis	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
export	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠis	 ﾠestimated.	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠa	 ﾠreference	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠxi	 ﾠfor	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠx,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠgenerated	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠ10%	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠx	 ﾠis	 ﾠequal	 ﾠto	 ﾠ(1.1
βx-ﾭ‐1),	 ﾠβx	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoefficient	 ﾠon	 ﾠx.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠin	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
probability	 ﾠis	 ﾠequal	 ﾠto	 ﾠ(1.1
βx-ﾭ‐1)Pxi.	 ﾠ13	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
product	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠare	 ﾠeither	 ﾠinsignificant	 ﾠor	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠin	 ﾠmagnitude,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠODT	 ﾠand	 ﾠPCS	 ﾠactivities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠresults	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠderive	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠODT	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
exports,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠspecific.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠhence	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠremaining	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠon	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠODT	 ﾠto	 ﾠODT	 ﾠexport	 ﾠactivities.	 ﾠ14	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠNature	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Explained variable: Domestic ODT new export link in t+1  Specifications 
   (1)  (2) 
Same product/country Foreign export  0.011**    
   (0.004)    
0/1 same product/country Foreign export  0.104***    
   (0.042)    
Other country/same product Foreign export  0.003**    
   (0.002)    
Same country/Other products Foreign export  -0.0001    
   (0.003)    
Other country/product Foreign export  -0.288    
   (0.209)    
Same product/country ODT Foreign export     0.017*** 
     (0.003) 
0/1 same product/country ODT Foreign export    0.062** 
     (0.027) 
Other country/same product ODT Foreign export    0.009** 
     (0.002) 
Same country/Other product ODT Foreign export    0.003 
     (0.002) 
Other country/product ODT Foreign export    0.082 
     (0.110) 
Same product/country PCS Foreign export     0.002 
     (0.007) 
0/1 same product/country PCS Foreign export    0.098* 
     (0.056) 
Other country/same product PCS Foreign export    0.004** 
    (0.002) 
Same country/other product PCS Foreign export    -0.002 
     (0.002) 
Other country/product PCS Foreign export    -0.007 
      (0.068) 
Controls for domestic own experience on export markets  yes 
Controls for demand (country-product imports and country GDP 
per capita)  yes 
Controls for Macro export (Balasssa, bilateral exports of China and 
of province, province GDP per capita)  yes 
Control for demand and macro export lags  yes 
Observations  4161535 
R-squared  0.125  0.125 
Share of domestic starts  0.219  0.219 
Province-product-destination country fixed effects  yes 
Year fixed effects  yes 
Heteroskedasticity-ﾭ‐robust	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠare	 ﾠreported	 ﾠin	 ﾠparentheses.	 ﾠStandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠare	 ﾠclustered	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ***,	 ﾠ**	 ﾠand	 ﾠ*	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1%,	 ﾠ5%	 ﾠand	 ﾠ10%	 ﾠconfidence	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠConditional	 ﾠ





3.2	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠand	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠinvestigate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠheterogeneity	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠdepending	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠrich	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠon	 ﾠaverage,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠeasier	 ﾠtargets	 ﾠfor	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ
Moreover,	 ﾠ rich	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ import	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ varieties	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ poor	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ (Hummels	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
Klenow,	 ﾠ2002),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcould	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthem	 ﾠmore	 ﾠaccessible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexporters	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠ would	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ valuable	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ prospective	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ exporters.	 ﾠ Overall,	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ
export	 ﾠ spillovers	 ﾠ might	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ destination	 ﾠ countries.	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ
conjecture	 ﾠis	 ﾠconfirmed	 ﾠby	 ﾠresults	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtable,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrun	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠ
regressions	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ low	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ high	 ﾠ GDP	 ﾠ per	 ﾠ capita	 ﾠ destination	 ﾠ countries.	 ﾠ A	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
considered	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠif	 ﾠits	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠis	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ9,059	 ﾠUS	 ﾠdollars	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠ
mean	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠsample)	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠclassified	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐GDP	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcomparison	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolumns	 ﾠ2	 ﾠand	 ﾠ3	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠ
(measured	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexporters)	 ﾠis	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠgroups.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmere	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexports	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ
j	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠand	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠstarts	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠ
per	 ﾠ capita	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ below	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ average.	 ﾠ Hence,	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ destination	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ poor,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
presence	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠstart	 ﾠby	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ13.2%	 ﾠ
(i.e.	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2.88	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠpoint).	 ﾠNo	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠemerge	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
value	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexports.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠcolumn,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠis	 ﾠconfirmed	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
interact	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdummy	 ﾠidentifying	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠspillover	 ﾠvariable:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoefficient	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠterm	 ﾠis	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠand	 ﾠsignificant.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠlast	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠis	 ﾠobtained	 ﾠthanks	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠinterpret	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcoefficients	 ﾠas	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠimpacts	 ﾠdirectly.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠreally	 ﾠat	 ﾠplay	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠheterogeneity	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠdepending	 ﾠon	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠICRG	 ﾠand	 ﾠDoing	 ﾠBusiness	 ﾠ





Table	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠExport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Heterogeneity indicator 
Destination country GDP per capita 
≠.  ≤ Mean  > Mean   Interaction 
 Explained variable: Domestic ODT new 
export link in t+1 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Same product/country ODT Foreign export  0.015***  0.015***  0.015***  0.005*** 
   (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.001) 
 
Same product/country ODT Foreign export 
* Above Threshold dummy         -0.001 
          (0.001) 
0/1 same product/country ODT Foreign 
export  0.079***  0.124***  0.036  0.033*** 
   (0.028)  (0.043)  (0.040)  (0.008) 
       -0.025** 
 
0/1 same product/country ODT Foreign 
export * Above Threshold dummy          (0.009) 
 
0.008***  0.007***  0.008***  0.001*** 
 
 
Other country/same product ODT Foreign 
export  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.0004) 
0.002  -0.001  0.006  -0.0004***  Same country/other product ODT Foreign 
export  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.00008) 
Other country/product ODT Foreign export  0.084  0.108  0.047  0.017*** 
   (0.107)  (0.117)  (0.100)  (0.001) 
Controls for domestic own experience on 
export markets  yes 
Controls for demand  yes 
Controls for Macro export  yes 
Control for demand and macro export lags  yes 
Observations  4161535  2350003  1311532  4161535 
R-squared  0.125  0.139  0.097  0.087 
Share of domestic starts  0.217  0.209  0.235  0.217 
Province-product-destination country fixed 
effects  yes 
Year fixed effects  yes 
Heteroskedasticity-ﾭ‐robust	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠare	 ﾠreported	 ﾠin	 ﾠparentheses.	 ﾠStandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠare	 ﾠclustered	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ***,	 ﾠ**	 ﾠand	 ﾠ*	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1%,	 ﾠ5%	 ﾠand	 ﾠ10%	 ﾠconfidence	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠConditional	 ﾠ
logit	 ﾠestimations	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠcolumns	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠa	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠis	 ﾠused.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.3	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠquality	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠnovel	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvestigate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠand	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠcreation	 ﾠof	 ﾠnew	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠlinkages	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountries’	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠquality.	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠICRG	 ﾠcomposite	 ﾠindex,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠweighted	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical,	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ economic	 ﾠ risks	 ﾠ indexes	 ﾠ (which	 ﾠ respective	 ﾠ weights	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ 50%,	 ﾠ 25%	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ 25%)	 ﾠ17	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
calculated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPRS	 ﾠgroup.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthis	 ﾠindex,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠless	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
entry	 ﾠon	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdifficult,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
stronger	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ3:	 ﾠExport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠquality	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Heterogeneity indicator 
Destination country ICRG composite index 
≠.  ≤ Mean  > Mean  Interaction 
Explained variable: Domestic ODT new export link in 
t+1 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Same product/country ODT Foreign export  0.015***  0.012**  0.017***  0.004*** 
   (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.001) 
Same product/country ODT Foreign export * Above 
Threshold dummy        0.001 
        
(0.001) 
 
0/1 same product/country ODT Foreign export  0.068**  0.141***  0.037  0.039*** 
   (0.029)  (0.045)  (0.038)  (0.009) 
0/1 same product/country ODT Foreign export * 
Above Threshold dummy        -0.003*** 
        
(0.001) 
 
Other country/same product ODT Foreign export  0.007***  0.006***  0.008***  0.0009*** 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.00007) 
Same country/other product ODT Foreign export  0.002  -0.002  0.003  -0.0004*** 
   (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.00009) 
Other country/product ODT Foreign export  0.095  0.094  0.091  0.019*** 
   (0.108)  (0.123)  (0.101)  (0.001) 




Controls for demand  yes 
Controls for Macro export  yes 
Control for demand and macro export lags  yes 
Observations  3850193  1904098  1946095  3850193 
R-squared  0.126  0.145  0.108  0.083 
Share of domestic starts  0.219  0.210  0.228  0.219 
Province-product-destination country fixed effects  yes 
Year fixed effects  yes 
Heteroskedasticity-ﾭ‐robust	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠare	 ﾠreported	 ﾠin	 ﾠparentheses.	 ﾠStandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠare	 ﾠclustered	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ***,	 ﾠ**	 ﾠand	 ﾠ*	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1%,	 ﾠ5%	 ﾠand	 ﾠ10%	 ﾠconfidence	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠConditional	 ﾠ
logit	 ﾠestimations	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠcolumns	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠa	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠis	 ﾠused.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ Table	 ﾠ 3,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ regressions	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ run	 ﾠ separately	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ low/high	 ﾠ ICRG	 ﾠ
composite	 ﾠ(defined	 ﾠas	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠbelow/above	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsample	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠ70)	 ﾠin	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠ2	 ﾠand	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ
respectively.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠj	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠt	 ﾠis	 ﾠpositively	 ﾠ
associated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠrise	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠstart	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ18	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
product	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠin	 ﾠt+1	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlow	 ﾠICRG	 ﾠcomposite	 ﾠindex	 ﾠonly,	 ﾠ
i.e.	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcompute	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmere	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexporters	 ﾠ
increases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠstart	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyear	 ﾠafter	 ﾠby	 ﾠ15.1%	 ﾠ(3.32	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠ
point)	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlow	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠICRG	 ﾠindex,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠa	 ﾠ10%	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ value	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ exports	 ﾠ raises	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ probability	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ 0.11%	 ﾠ (0.02	 ﾠ
percentage	 ﾠpoint).	 ﾠFor	 ﾠless	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
detected,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠa	 ﾠ10%	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexports	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠj	 ﾠ
increases	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ probability	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ starts	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ 0.16%	 ﾠ (0.04	 ﾠ percentage	 ﾠ point).	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ
difference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠboth	 ﾠsamples	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“intensive	 ﾠmargin”	 ﾠof	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠis	 ﾠthus	 ﾠ
negligible.	 ﾠAgain,	 ﾠresults	 ﾠare	 ﾠqualitatively	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠcapturing	 ﾠheterogeneity	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠ interaction	 ﾠ term	 ﾠ (column	 ﾠ 4).	 ﾠ These	 ﾠ results	 ﾠ suggest	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ exporters	 ﾠ
penetrating	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpoor	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠquality	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠdifferentially	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ multinational	 ﾠ firm	 ﾠ exposure	 ﾠb e c a u s e 	 ﾠt h e y 	 ﾠa r e 	 ﾠc o n f r o n t e d 	 ﾠt o 	 ﾠg r e a t e r 	 ﾠr i s k s 	 ﾠa n d 	 ﾠ
informational	 ﾠasymmetries.	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠour	 ﾠfindings	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠproximity	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexporters	 ﾠreduces	 ﾠinformational	 ﾠbarriers	 ﾠto	 ﾠtrade.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.4	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠand	 ﾠimport	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Finally,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠanother	 ﾠdimension	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠof	 ﾠentry	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠmarket,	 ﾠusing	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠ measures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ restrictive	 ﾠ effect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ administrative	 ﾠ procedures	 ﾠ imposed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠimports:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsignature	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelivery	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgoods,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠdays	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarrival	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠcommodities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠharbor	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdelivery.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠ
variables,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentry	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Results	 ﾠ presented	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Table	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ indicate	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ province	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ
exports	 ﾠof	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠk	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠj	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠstart	 ﾠ
exporting	 ﾠk	 ﾠto	 ﾠj	 ﾠby	 ﾠ10.63%	 ﾠ(2.41	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠpoint)	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠ
required	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ destination	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ high,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ 13.66%	 ﾠ (2.84	 ﾠ percentage	 ﾠ point)	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠdays	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarrival	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠharbor	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdelivery	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
commodities	 ﾠis	 ﾠhigh.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ19	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ4:	 ﾠExport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠand	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠ
Heterogeneity indicator 
  Nb of documents  Nb of days 
 Explained variable: Domestic ODT new 
export link in t+1 
   ≠.  ≤ Mean  > Mean   Interaction  ≤ Mean  > Mean  Interaction  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Same product/country ODT Foreign export  0.016***  0.016***  0.016**  0.006***  0.017***  0.014***  0.006*** 
   (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
Same product/country ODT Foreign export 
* Above Threshold dummy         0.001      -0.0004 
          (0.001)      (0.001) 
0/1 same product/country ODT Foreign 
export  0.069**  0.052  0.101*  0.008  0.041  0.128***  0.008 
   (0.031)  (0.045)  (0.056)  (0.006)  (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.006) 
0/1 same product/country ODT Foreign 
export * Above Threshold dummy         0.019*      0.025** 
          (0.010)      (0.012) 
Othe country/same product ODT Foreign 
export  0.008***  0.008***  0.007***  0.001***  0.008***  0.007***  0.001*** 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.00007)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.00007) 
Same country/other product ODT Foreign 
export  0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.0005***  0.006  -0.002  -0.001*** 
   (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.00009)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.00009) 
Other country/product ODT Foreign export  0.101  0.069  0.101  0.018***  0.070  0.097  0.017*** 
   (0.122)  (0.097)  (0.122)  (0.001)  (0.097)  (0.120)  (0.001) 
Controls for domestic own experience on 
export markets  yes 
Controls for demand  yes 
Controls for Macro export  yes 
Control for demand and macro export lags  yes 
Observations  4041770  1747070  2294700  4041770  1743238   2298532  4041770 
R-squared  0.124  0.105  0.140  0.086  0.104   0.141  0.086 
Share of domestic starts  0.218  0.227   0.211  0.218  0.230   0.208  0.218 
Heteroskedasticity-ﾭ‐robust	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠare	 ﾠreported	 ﾠin	 ﾠparentheses.	 ﾠStandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠare	 ﾠclustered	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ***,	 ﾠ**	 ﾠand	 ﾠ*	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1%,	 ﾠ
5%	 ﾠand	 ﾠ10%	 ﾠconfidence	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠConditional	 ﾠlogit	 ﾠestimations	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠcolumns	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlast	 ﾠcolumn	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠa	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠis	 ﾠused.	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No	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ impact	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ exporter	 ﾠ presence	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ detected	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ administrative	 ﾠ
procedures	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠare	 ﾠlighter.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
exports	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠacross	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠResults	 ﾠare	 ﾠqualitatively	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠmeasuring	 ﾠheterogeneity	 ﾠthanks	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠinteractive	 ﾠterm.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠ Conclusion	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstudy,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexplore	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintensity	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexport	 ﾠspillovers	 ﾠin	 ﾠChina	 ﾠvaries	 ﾠ
depending	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠof	 ﾠentry	 ﾠon	 ﾠexport	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠallows	 ﾠto	 ﾠshed	 ﾠlight	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠmultinational	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠinfluences	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorientation	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠ
domestic	 ﾠ firms’	 ﾠ integration	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ world	 ﾠ economy.	 ﾠ Several	 ﾠ studies	 ﾠ show	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
presence	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠprovinces	 ﾠand	 ﾠcities	 ﾠpositively	 ﾠimpacts	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentry	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠon	 ﾠexport	 ﾠmarkets.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexternality	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexposure	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
foreign	 ﾠ exporters	 ﾠ partially	 ﾠ acts	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ information	 ﾠ spillovers,	 ﾠ hence	 ﾠ helping	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
prospective	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠexporter	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠnew	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠlinkages,	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfind,	 ﾠusing	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠproxies	 ﾠto	 ﾠdefine	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“difficult”	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠis.	 ﾠOur	 ﾠresults	 ﾠ
indicate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠones	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
start	 ﾠexporting,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠare	 ﾠrisky,	 ﾠas	 ﾠmeasured	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ICRG	 ﾠindex,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthey	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠtough	 ﾠadministrative	 ﾠprocedures	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimport	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
commodities.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
China	 ﾠmight	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdiversification	 ﾠof	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠexports	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠand	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠinaccessible	 ﾠdestinations.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠon	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠexposure	 ﾠto	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
exporters	 ﾠis	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ10%	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠstart	 ﾠ
exporting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠyear,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠis	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ50%	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtargeted	 ﾠdestination	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠis	 ﾠidentified	 ﾠas	 ﾠdifficult.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠmean	 ﾠthat	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠ
firms	 ﾠexport	 ﾠto	 ﾠeasier	 ﾠmarkets	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠcounterparts	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgap	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ types	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ decreases	 ﾠ over	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ thanks	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ spillovers.	 ﾠ By	 ﾠ
contrast	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠactually	 ﾠexport	 ﾠon	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠto	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrisky	 ﾠmarkets,	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ administrative	 ﾠ procedures	 ﾠ imposed	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ imports	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ (by	 ﾠ roughly	 ﾠ
10%)	 ﾠtougher	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠto	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexporters	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠin	 ﾠChina.	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠour	 ﾠresults	 ﾠ
show	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠprovince	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexport	 ﾠyet	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
given	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeneficial	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠexposure	 ﾠto	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠexporters	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠ21	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ Chinese	 ﾠ domestic	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ start	 ﾠ exporting	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ product	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ new	 ﾠ destination	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
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